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1007 
United States v. Lambis: A Good Call for Cellphones, 
Cell-site Simulators, and the Fourth Amendment 
I. Introduction 
Perhaps when you were a child, you liked to play this classic twist on 
“hide and seek” with your friends. The “seeker” would count aloud to some 
designated number while the “hiders” scurried about and jockeyed for the 
best hiding position. Once the seeker rounded up a few of the other hiders, 
the hiders would then begin to provide the seeker with clues to your 
location—shouting “warmer” when the seeker was nearing your spot or 
taunting “freezing cold” when the seeker was off searching another room. 
Eventually the game would come to an end when you heard your friends 
shriek, “boiling hot!” as the curtain you were cowering behind was 
suddenly ripped open. Now imagine a technological tool equivalent to your 
childhood friends that relied on your own cellphone to provide hints to your 
location. If you are one of the ninety-two percent of American adults who 
own a cellphone of some kind, this is understandably concerning.
1
  
Cell-site simulators—also referred to as “StingRays,” “Hailstorms,” 
“TriggerFish,” or “IMSI catchers”—are powerful surveillance tools that 
enable law enforcement officers and agencies to pinpoint a cellphone’s 
location within a few yards.
2
 Just as someone’s shouts would drown out 
another’s whisper, cell-site simulators drown out the signals of legitimate 
cell towers and force cellphones nearby to connect with them instead.
3
 
Once connected, the information captured by cell-site simulators can range 
from real-time location data to the content of communications.
4
 Because 
                                                                                                             
 1. Monica Anderson, Technology Device Ownership: 2015, PEW RES. CTR., Oct. 29, 
2015, http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/10/PI_2015-10-29_device-ownership_FINAL. 
pdf. 
 2. United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), appeal 
withdrawn, No. 16-3146, 2017 U.S. App. WL 4127919 (2d Cir. Mar. 13, 2017).; Cell-Site 
Simulators/IMSI Catchers, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (last visited Mar. 23, 2017), 
https://www.eff.org/sls/tech/cell-site-simulators. 
 3. Cell-Site Simulators/IMSI Catchers, supra note 2. “Cellular networks are distributed 
over geographic areas called ‘cells.’” Id. “Each cell is served by [a tower], also known as a 
cell-site.” Id. “Your [cell]phone naturally connects with the closest [cell-site] to provide you 
with service as you move” around. Id. Essentially, cell-site simulators trick your cellphone 
into thinking they are cell-sites. Id. 
 4. Id. Primarily, cell-site simulators target four types of information: “(1) identifying 
information about the [cellphone] like the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) 
number”; (2) “metadata about calls like who you are dialing and duration of call”; (3) “the 
content of SMS and voice calls”; and (4) “data usage, such as websites visited.” Id. 
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cellphones are constantly communicating with cell towers even if they are 
safely tucked away in an owner’s purse or pocket, the only way to protect 
oneself from susceptibility to a nearby cell-site simulator is to shut the 
cellphone off completely.
5
 Cell-site simulators thus operate in a dragnet 
fashion—scooping up data and information not only from the targeted 




This Note will examine United States v. Lambis, a recent decision by the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and 
discuss the decision’s unfavorable treatment of the warrantless use of cell-
site simulators by law enforcement officers and agencies.
7
 Part I provided a 
brief introduction to cell-site simulator technology.
8
 Part II examines the 
landmark decisions that have shaped current Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, especially those doctrines relied on by the district court in 
the Lambis opinion.
9
 Part III describes the circumstances surrounding the 
events that led to United States v. Lambis,
10
 while Part IV discusses the 
district court’s decision.
11
 Part V analyzes the district court’s unique 
application of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to cutting-edge 
technology,
12
 and argues that courts across the country should adopt a 
similar line of reasoning. Finally, Part VI draws conclusions regarding the 
current state of privacy and protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment 
and emphasizes why a novel approach like that found in United States v. 





                                                                                                             
 5. Cell-Site Simulators: Frequently Asked Questions: Can I Prevent Having My Data 
Captured by Cell Site Simulators?, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (last visited Mar. 23, 
2017), https://www.eff.org/node/89287#faq-Can-I-prevent-having-my-data-captured-by-
cell-site-simulators?.  
 6. Cell-Site Simulators: Frequently Asked Questions: How Does It Work?, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (last visited Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.eff.org/node/89287 
#faq-How-does-it-work?. 
 7. See Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606.  
 8. See Cell-Site Simulators/IMSI Catchers, supra note 2. 
 9. See Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 609-16. 
 10. See id. at 608-09. 
 11. See id. at 609-16. 
 12. See id. 
 13. See id. 
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II. Law Before the Case 
A. The Fourth Amendment’s Guarantee Against Unreasonable Searches 
What began as a get-rich-quick scheme for one individual quickly 
ballooned into a landmark Fourth Amendment case: Katz v. United States.
14
 
Charles Katz was the target of a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) sting 
operation in which FBI agents attached an electronic eavesdropping device 
to the outside of a telephone booth Katz was regularly using to transmit 
wagering information across the country.
15
 Katz was subsequently arrested, 
charged, and convicted; he later challenged his conviction, arguing that the 
electronic eavesdropping device and its recordings violated his Fourth 




The Fourth Amendment provides, “The right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches . . . shall not be violated.”
17
 Traditionally, this right was guarded 
via application of the physical trespass doctrine, whereby physical 
intrusions into a constitutionally protected area to obtain information were 
regarded as unreasonable searches.
18
 This theory has made a resurgence in 
recent years following the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Jones.
19
 There, the Court held that installing a global positioning system 
(GPS) device on the undercarriage of a vehicle and using the device to 
monitor the vehicle’s movements over an extended period of time 
constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment because 
the government had usurped the individual’s property.
20
  
The more modern doctrine, however, was first described in Justice 
Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States and is composed of two 
prongs.
21
 If an individual can show that (1) he or she had a subjective 
                                                                                                             
 14. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 15. Id. at 348. 
 16. Id. 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 18. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404-06 (2012) (discussing the origin of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). 
 19. See id. 
 20. Id. at 404 (“We hold that the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a 
target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a 
‘search.’”). 
 21. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My understanding of the rule that 
has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person 
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation 
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expectation of privacy in what was searched, and (2) that society is 
prepared to recognize that individual’s expectation as reasonable, then the 
search was unreasonable.
22
 Because the first prong is more easily satisfied 
due to its subjective nature, the Supreme Court more often focuses on 
whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in what was searched 
to determine the reasonableness of the intrusion and whether it comports 
with the Fourth Amendment.
23
  
To utilize the physical trespass doctrine when dealing with electronic 
surveillance would be an exercise in futility, as no physical intrusion is 
actually involved in the invasion.
24
 The reasonable expectation of privacy 
test from Katz v. United States
25
 is therefore the appropriate analysis for 
searches comprised solely of electronic surveillance—as confirmed by the 
Supreme Court in Jones.
26
 If government conduct invades a reasonable 
expectation of privacy,
27
 then the conduct is considered an unreasonable 
search for Fourth Amendment purposes.
28
 Under this standard, Katz’s 
challenge was successful and the recordings from the electronic 
eavesdropping device were suppressed.
29
   
                                                                                                             
be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”). This two-step test described 
by Justice Harlan, though applied in intervening cases, was not formally ratified by the Court 
until 1979. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). 
 22. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 23. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (“Consistently with Katz, this Court uniformly has held that 
the application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its 
protection can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’  
that has been invaded by government action.”) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1977); 
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 
(1976); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 
322, 335–36 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (plurality opinion); 
Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)). 
 24. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 411-12. 
 25. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 26. Jones, 565 U.S. at 411 (“Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic 
signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”). 
 27. For example, the Supreme Court has held that searching the digital contents of a 
cellphone incident to arrest and without the authorization of a warrant violated the Fourth 
Amendment. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2477 (2014). 
 28. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740. 
 29. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss4/7
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B. Which Test to Use in Light of Cell-site Simulators? Making Sense of the 
Supreme Court’s Myriad of Fact-Intensive Rules 
Since the Supreme Court has yet to decide whether the warrantless use of 
a cell-site simulator invades a reasonable expectation of privacy and is 
therefore an unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, it is important to consider the myriad of fact-intensive rules 
that inform the Supreme Court’s reasoning in such matters. 
1. Knotts, Karo, and Searches Within the Home 
One oft-quoted rationale of the Court’s decision in Katz v. United States 
is that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”
30
 This radical 
departure from the physical trespass doctrine meant that anyone could enjoy 
an expectation of privacy wherever he or she may go, untethered from 
previous ideas that protection should singularly be afforded to places such 
as a home.
31
 Even under modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 
however, an individual’s home is still accorded the highest degree of 
protection when compared to an individual’s car, container, or the like.
32
 
This elevated level of protection is afforded because the very core of the 
Fourth Amendment entitles an individual to “retreat into his [or her] own 
home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”
33
 
Absent a few well-delineated exceptions, the search of a home typically 
requires a warrant; without one, the search is presumptively unreasonable.
34
 
This is so because the search warrant requirement was designed primarily 
“to interpose a ‘neutral and detached magistrate’ between the citizen and 




Two cases—United States v. Knotts
36
 and United States v. Karo
37
—
illustrate this principle in a striking manner. Both cases involved “beepers” 
surreptitiously installed by law enforcement in cans of chemicals expected 
to later be used in drug manufacturing.
38
 The beepers allowed law 
                                                                                                             
 30. Id. at 351. 
 31. See id.  
 32. See id. at 359. 
 33. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). 
 34. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1984). 
 35. Id. at 717 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). 
 36. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 37. 468 U.S. at 705. 
 38. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 276; Karo, 468 U.S. at 705. 
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In Knotts, law enforcement tracked the cans as they were placed into a 
vehicle and traveled along public roads.
40
 While police were able to 
maintain visual contact for most of the journey, they had to rely on the 
beeper’s capabilities to ascertain the exact resting place of the cans once the 
journey had come to an end outside a cabin owned by Knotts.
41
 Because 
there was no indication that the beeper was used to gather information 
regarding the private area inside Knotts’s cabin, the Supreme Court ruled 
that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s movements 
from one place to another when traveling on “public thoroughfares.”
42
  
In Karo, however, law enforcement tracked the cans as they were sold, 
moved between multiple residences and commercial storage lockers, and 
eventually came to rest inside a private residence.
43
 This critical 
distinction—where the cans came to rest—led the Supreme Court to draw a 
definite rule that “[t]he monitoring of a beeper in a private residence, a 
location not opened to visual surveillance, violates the Fourth Amendment 
rights of those who have a justifiable interest in the privacy of the 
residence.”
44
 In light of both cases, it seems the Supreme Court would 
likely find a search unreasonable where an electronic tracking device is 
used to reveal information from within a home. 
2. Kyllo v. United States and Technology Not Commonly Available to 
the Public 
In Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court added another interesting 
piece to the Fourth Amendment puzzle.
45
 After Knotts and Karo clarified 
that the Supreme Court was willing to draw a line between tracking 
technology used within the home and that used outside the home, the Kyllo 
Court took a step further to draw a “firm but also bright” line at the 




                                                                                                             
 39. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 276; Karo, 468 U.S. at 705. 
 40. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 276. 
 41. Id. at 279. 
 42. Id. at 276 (“A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements.”). 
 43. Karo, 468 U.S. at 705. 
 44. Id. at 706. 
 45. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 46. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. 
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Danny Kyllo’s home was the subject of an investigation after law 
enforcement agents became suspicious that he was growing marijuana 
inside.
47
 Agents used a thermal imaging device to record heat emanating 
from Kyllo’s home.
48
 The device revealed an unusual amount of heat 
radiating from his garage when compared to the rest of his home.
49
 Agents 
then used this information to obtain a search warrant, which ultimately 
aided in their discovery of a large amount of marijuana plants.
50
 The 
Supreme Court, however, held that the use of the thermal imaging device 
was an unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.
51
 In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court relied heavily on 
the fact that the technology employed by the agents was not in use by the 
general public.
52
 Taking the rationale of Knotts and Karo one step further, 
the Supreme Court carved out yet another Fourth Amendment protection 
whereby a search occurs when sense-enhancing technology that is not in 
general public use is utilized to obtain any information regarding the 
interior of a home that could not otherwise have been obtained without 
physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.
53
 
3. Smith v. Maryland and the Third Party Doctrine 
In light of modern technological advances, the “third party doctrine” is 
one area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that has a rather chilling 
bright-line rule.
54
 In Smith v. Maryland, local police installed a pen register 
                                                                                                             
 47. Id. at 29. 
 48. Id. In order to grow marijuana indoors, a large amount of light is needed for the 
plants to undergo photosynthesis, which results in an abnormally large heat signature. Id.; 
see also Gina S. Warren, Regulating Pot to Save the Polar Bear: Energy and Climate 
Impacts of the Marijuana Industry, 40 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 385, 403-04 (2015). 
 49. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 40. 
 52. Id. at 34-35. 
 53. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (“Where . . . the Government uses a device that is not in 
general public use, to explore details of [a private] home that would previously have been 
unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a [Fourth Amendment] ‘search’ 
and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”). 
 54. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“This Court has held 
repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information 
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the 
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and 
the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”); see also Smith v. Maryland, 
442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (“This Court consistently has held that a person has no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”). 
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on telephone company property to record all the numbers dialed from a 
particular telephone in order to trace the source of menacing calls made to a 
robbery victim.
55
 Shortly thereafter, Michael Smith was identified as the 
culprit.
56
 At trial, Smith sought to suppress “all fruits derived from the pen 
register” because the police had failed to obtain a warrant before its 
installation and therefore violated his reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the telephone numbers he dialed.
57




In what is known as the third party doctrine, the Supreme Court has 
consistently recognized that individuals have no reasonable expectation of 




The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, 
that the information will be conveyed by that person to the 
Government. . . . [T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the 
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed 
by him to Government authorities, even if the information is 
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited 




The Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Maryland, however, was handed 
down in 1979.
61
 Is such a bright-line rule still appropriate in light of modern 
technological advances? At least one Justice of the United States Supreme 




                                                                                                             
 55. Smith, 442 U.S. at 737. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 745-46 (concluding Smith did not entertain an actual expectation of privacy in 
the phone numbers he dialed and that even if he did, his expectation was not legitimate). 
 59. E.g., id.; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-44 (1976); Couch v. United 
States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971); 
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 
(1963). 
 60. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (citations omitted). 
 61. 442 U.S. at 735. 
 62. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413-18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
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C. Consequences of Multiple Tests: Confusion in the Lower Courts  
Unsure of what line of reasoning to follow, courts across the country 
have issued a dizzying series of opinions regarding cell-site simulators and 
other related technology. For example, the Fourth Circuit recently held that 
the government did not violate the Fourth Amendment when it obtained 
historical cell-site location information from a cellphone provider without a 
warrant because the defendants had voluntarily conveyed that information 
to a third party by making and receiving calls and texts on their 
cellphones.
63
 Yet, the Third Circuit disagrees with the idea that such actions 
constituted a voluntary conveyance of location information.
64
 And the Fifth 
Circuit would draw a dispositive line based on whether it is the government 
collecting the information or “whether it is a third party, of its own accord 
and for its own purposes, recording the information.”
65
  
Similar to the Third Circuit, a Maryland court chose to simply reason 
that “people have a reasonable expectation that their cell phones will not be 
used as real-time tracking devices by law enforcement.”
66
 Likewise, the 
Florida Supreme Court has concluded that society is prepared to recognize 
a subjective expectation of privacy in location signals transmitted by 
cellphones.
67
 If anything can be demonstrated by the confusion among the 
lower courts, it is that there is a definitive need for a clear directive on how 
to apply the Fourth Amendment to cutting-edge technology such as cell-site 
                                                                                                             
 63. United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc). Similarly, the 
Sixth Circuit recently held the government did not conduct a search for Fourth Amendment 
purposes when it obtained business records from the defendants’ wireless carriers that 
contained historical cell-site location information. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 
890 (6th Cir. 2016). The Eleventh Circuit has also held that obtaining historical cell tower 
location information via a third-party telephone company’s business records did not violate 
the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 518 (11th 
Cir. 2015). 
 64. In re the Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Comm'n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 317-18 (3d Cir. 2010) (“A 
cell phone customer has not ‘voluntarily’ shared his location information with a cellular 
provider in any meaningful way.”). 
 65. In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 610 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 66. State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 327 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016). 
 67. Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 526 (Fla. 2014) (“[W]e conclude that such a 
subjective expectation of privacy of location as signaled by one’s cell phone—even on 
public roads—is an expectation of privacy that society is now prepared to recognize as 
objectively reasonable under the Katz ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test.”).  
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III. Statement of the Case 
A. Facts 
United States v. Lambis centers around a cellphone.
69
 In the course of an 
international drug trafficking investigation, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) came to suspect Hugo Fernando Valenzuela Gomez 
of brokering the movement of thousands of kilograms of narcotics through 
South America, Central America, Europe, and the United States.
70
 
Accordingly, the DEA obtained judicial authorization to tap Gomez’s 
communications.
71
 In the New York area, Gomez and his associates 
allegedly possessed a large amount of heroin.
72
 To improve the quality of 
the heroin, Gomez needed hydrochloric acid.
73
 “On or about August, 15, 
2015, the DEA intercepted a BlackBerry exchange” between Gomez and an 
associate that read, “646 894 4983 ‘patilla.’ It’s for the liquids.”
74
  
The cellphone belonging to “Patilla” quickly morphed into the target of 
the DEA’s investigation.
75
 Hoping to gather more information, the DEA 
sought a warrant for the targeted cellphone’s pen register information and 
cell site location information (CSLI).
76
 The pen register information—"a 
record from the service provider” that includes telephone numbers dialed 
from the cellphone—allowed the DEA to approximate a network of 
criminal associates using the targeted cellphone.
77
 Even more illuminating, 
the CSLI—a record from the service provider that includes location 
                                                                                                             
 68. United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), appeal withdrawn, 
No. 16-3146, 2017 U.S. App. WL 4127919 (2d Cir. Mar. 13, 2017). 
 69. Id. at 608. 
 70. The Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence, Exhibit 
A at 11-12, United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:15-cr-
00734). 
 71. Id. at 11. 
 72. Id. at 12. 
 73. Id. Based on her training, experience, and involvement in this particular 
investigation, DEA Special Agent Kathryn Glover alleged that hydrochloric acid is 
commonly used, often in large quantities, to purify lower-quality heroin, also referred to as 
“street” heroin. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 13. 
 76. United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), appeal 
withdrawn, No. 16-3146, 2017 U.S. App. WL 4127919 (2d Cir. Mar. 13, 2017). 
 77. Id. 
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information derived from “pings” sent by the cellphone to nearby cell 
sites—allowed the DEA to approximate the general location of the targeted 
cellphone based on its previous use.
78
  
Using the CSLI, DEA agents were able to determine the approximate 
location of the targeted cellphone within a few blocks.
79
 Within this small 
area of the Washington Heights neighborhood of New York City, however, 
were several apartment complexes, each containing a multitude of units.
80
 
The CSLI was simply not precise enough to trace the targeted cellphone 
back to any single complex or unit.
81
 Failing to first seek the authorization 
of a warrant, the DEA deployed a technician with a cell-site simulator in the 




Calculating the strength of the pings intercepted on their way to the 
nearest cell tower, the technician was able to trace the targeted cellphone to 
a specific apartment complex.
83
 The technician then entered the apartment 
building and began to walk the halls until he located a specific apartment 
unit—home to Raymond Lambis—where the strength of the pings 
emanating was the greatest.
84
 That evening, DEA agents knocked on the 
door.
85
 After being let into the apartment, the DEA obtained consent from 
Lambis to search his bedroom.
86
 Ultimately, the search yielded narcotics 
and paraphernalia that became the crux of the Government’s case, including 
cocaine, three digital scales, empty ziplock bags, an X-Acto knife, and a 
large plastic bag containing approximately eight cellphones.
87
 
B. Procedural History and Issue 
After his arrest, Raymond Lambis was charged with one count of 
conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance—a charge that carries a 
prison sentence of five to forty years upon conviction.
88
 Lambis sought to 
have the narcotics and drug paraphernalia suppressed and was ultimately 
                                                                                                             
 78. Id. at 608-09. 
 79. Id. at 609. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id.  
 82. Id.  
 83. Id.  
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Complaint at 3, United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 
1:15-cr-00734). 
 88. Id. at 1; 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2012). 
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successful by arguing that the DEA’s warrantless use of a cell-site 
simulator to locate his cellphone within his apartment violated his Fourth 




To begin its analysis, the Southern District of New York first 
emphasized the Fourth Amendment’s command of reasonableness.
90
 A few 
sentences later, however, the court pointedly reemphasized that warrantless 
searches are per se unreasonable barring a few narrow exceptions.
91
 
Continuing, the court then highlighted the home’s “special significance 
under the Fourth Amendment” before diving into current case law.
92
 
The district court first turned to the seminal Supreme Court case Kyllo v. 
United States.
93
 The court was especially concerned that the technology 
presently before it in Lambis
94
 was the exact kind of technology the 
Supreme Court warned of in Kyllo.
95
 Comparing cellphone pings to heat 
emanating from a home, the district court observed that neither were readily 
observable to “anyone who wanted to look” without the use of a cell-site 
simulator or thermal imaging device.
96
 Just as the thermal imaging device 
in Kyllo revealed “details of the home that would previously have been 
unknowable without physical intrusion,”
97




Rejecting the Government’s argument that the information gathered from 
the cell-site simulator was only the targeted cellphone’s location and not 
intimate details “such as ‘what hour each night the lady of the house takes 
                                                                                                             
 89. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 616. 
 90. Id. at 609. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id.; 533 U.S. 27 (2001). To reiterate, the Supreme Court in Kyllo held that, 
“[w]here . . . the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore 
details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, 
the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.” Id. at 
40. In part, the Supreme Court rejected the Government’s argument because distinguishing 
between “‘off-the-wall’ observations and ‘through-the-wall surveillance’” would leave the 
“homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology.” Id. at 35; see supra Section II.B.2. 
 94. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 609-10. 
 95. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35-36. 
 96. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 610 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 
(1983)). 
 97. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. 
 98. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 610. 
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her daily sauna and bath,’”
99
 the district court relied on a Second Circuit 
opinion that found such distinctions inappropriate even if they solely 
revealed “the presence or absence of narcotics.”
100
 In the case of 
cellphones, the court concluded that an electronic search was “far more 
intrusive . . . because, unlike narcotics, cell phones are neither contraband 
nor illegal. In fact, they are ubiquitous.”
101
 Again similar to the thermal 
imaging device in Kyllo, the court noted that cell-site simulators are not a 
device in general public use.
102
 Thus, the DEA’s warrantless use of the cell-
site simulator to locate Lambis’s apartment was an unreasonable search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
103
 
The district court also supported its reasoning
104
 with another Supreme 
Court case of monumental importance—United States v. Karo.
105
 In Karo, 
the Supreme Court held that, “the monitoring of a beeper in a private 
residence, a location not opened to visual surveillance, violates the Fourth 
Amendment rights of those who have a justifiable interest in the privacy of 
the residence.”
106
 In so holding, the Supreme Court spurned the 
Government’s argument that if requisite justification exists on the facts to 
support “that monitoring the beeper” wherever it may go would “produce 
evidence of criminal activity,” the government’s conduct should not 
constitute a search.
107
 Like the Supreme Court in Karo,
108
 the district court 
in Lambis
109
 strongly undercut this contention, fearing the exception would 
swallow the rule as the primary reason for the warrant requirement is to 
“interpose a ‘neutral and detached magistrate’ between the citizen and ‘the 
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime.’”
110
 Even though the DEA believed that by using the cell-site 
                                                                                                             
 99. Id. (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38). 
 100. See United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1366-67 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that a 
canine sniff constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment “when employed at a person’s 
home”). 
 101. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 610. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. at 611. 
 104. Id.  
 105. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
 106. Id. at 714. 
 107. Id. at 717. 
 108. Id. (recognizing that “[w]arrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable”). 
 109. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 611 (“[E]ven though the DEA believed that the use of 
the cell-site simulator would reveal the location of a phone associated with criminal activity,  
the Fourth Amendment requires the Government to obtain a warrant from a neutral 
magistrate to conduct that search.”). 
 110. Karo, 468 U.S. at 717 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). 
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simulator it would pinpoint the location of a cellphone involved in criminal 
activity, the district court stressed that it was the role of a neutral magistrate 
to make the call.
111
 The court also pointed out that whatever warrants were 
obtained in the course of the investigation (namely the warrants for pen 
register information and CSLI information), the DEA clearly exceeded their 
scope by obtaining information via the cell-site simulator, which was not 
contemplated by the original warrant application.
112
 
Turning its attention to another relevant Fourth Amendment concern, the 
district court discussed the third party doctrine.
113
 Disregarding altogether 
whether or not the third party doctrine is best suited for the digital age,
114
 
the district court went straight to Smith v. Maryland.
115
 In Smith, a case 
involving pen registers, the Supreme Court reasoned that the third party 
doctrine applies when a party, “voluntarily turns over [information] to third 
parties.”
116
 The district court, however, made findings based on two 
observations that “the location information detected by a cell-site simulator 
is different in kind from pen register information: it is neither initiated by 
the user nor sent to a third party.”
117
  
First, “cell phone users do not actively submit their location information” 
to service providers.
118
 Rather, cellphones automatically send signals to 
nearby cell towers to maintain a connection to the network, and other 
courts
119
 have concluded that these passive signals do not trigger the third 
                                                                                                             
 111. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 611. 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at 614-16. 
 114. Id. at 614. 
 115. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 116. Id. at 744. 
 117. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 614. 
 118. Id. at 615 (quoting State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 325 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2016)). 
 119. See In re the Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of 
Elec. Comm'n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 317-18 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“A cell phone customer has not “voluntarily” shared his location information with a cellular 
provider in any meaningful way.”); Tracey v. State, 152 So.3d 504, 526 (Fla. 2014) (“[W]e 
conclude that such a subjective expectation of privacy of location as signaled by one’s cell 
phone—even on public roads—is an expectation of privacy that society is now prepared to 
recognize as objectively reasonable under the Katz ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ 
test.”); State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 641 (N.J. 2013) (citations omitted) (“When people make 
disclosures to phone companies and other providers to use their services, they are not 
promoting the release of personal information to others. . . . Instead, they can reasonably 
expect that their personal information will remain private.”). 
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 Furthermore, the district court pointed out that cell-site 
simulators involve an additional layer of involuntariness as they force all 




Second, cell-site simulators do not involve a third party because “[t]he 
question of who is recording [the] information”—a third party or the 
government—is dispositive.
122
 By using a cell-site simulator to derive a 
cellphone’s location based on involuntarily conveyed signals, “the 
Government cuts out the middleman and obtains the information 
directly.”
123




Ultimately, the district court rejected the Government’s argument that 
the warrantless use of the cell-site simulator to locate Lambis was 
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
125
 The court 
suppressed the evidence recovered by the DEA agents from Lambis’s 
apartment and quashed the Government’s case while warning, “[a]bsent a 





Amid growing cries to constrain the government’s use of electronic 
surveillance, United States v. Lambis serves as a shining example of what 
courts across the country can do to better safeguard the protections 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment while balancing the needs of law 
enforcement to control crime.
127
 Marking the first federal ruling of its 
kind
128
—namely that the warrantless use of cell-site simulators constitutes 
an unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment—the 
Southern District of New York’s elegant analysis in Lambis provides other 
                                                                                                             
 120. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 615. 
 121. Id. (citations omitted). 
 122. Id. at 616 (quoting In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 
610 (5th Cir. 2013)). 
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 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 611, 616. 
 127. See generally id. at 608-16. 
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The genius of the Lambis opinion stems from the court’s willingness to 
borrow a straight flush from the deck of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
instead of merely playing its ace. For example, the issue of whether cell-site 
simulators are devices commonly available to the public is certainly a 
dispositive one.
130
 If the district court had solely made findings that cell-site 
simulators are not devices commonly available to the public, then a 
warrantless search via a cell-site simulator is theoretically a search that is 
presumptively unreasonable. An opinion resting on those findings alone, 
however, would be a dangerous one. If tomorrow the makers of Candy 
Crush Saga were to release a new iPhone application, “Cell-site Simulator 
Saga,” the district court’s reasoning would be swiftly undermined. By using 
each Fourth Amendment tool at its disposal, the district court built a sturdy 
opinion with a strong foundation in case law.  
The benefit of such an approach is that it makes the district court’s 
analysis easily transferrable to similar cases, even those that may be 
factually dissimilar. Was your client outside his home at the time law 
enforcement used a cell-site simulator to pinpoint his location? Try the 
district court’s line of reasoning regarding the third party doctrine.
131
 Did 
the trial court make findings against your client that he voluntarily 
conveyed his location information to his cellphone service provider and 
therefore the third party doctrine was triggered? Consider arguing that the 
government’s conduct was unreasonable under the district court’s 
interpretation of Karo.
132
 If other courts were to adopt an analysis similar to 
Lambis, Fourth Amendment protections would clearly be the winner.
133
 
At a time when society is struggling to strike a balance between the 
legitimate goals of law enforcement and privacy protections, Lambis 
demonstrates how to best address both concerns.
134
 Largely unknown to the 
public until recently, cell-site simulators play an increasing role in law 
                                                                                                             
 129. See 197 F. Supp. 3d at 608-16. 
 130. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“[O]btaining by sense-enhancing 
technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have 
been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area’ . . . 
constitutes a search—at least where . . . the technology in question is not in general public 
use.” (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961))). 
 131. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 614-16. 
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 133. See generally id. at 608-16. 
 134. Id. 
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 While the public has become savvy of the government’s 
growing reliance on electronic surveillance and several states have passed 
legislative restrictions, courts should actively seek to adjudicate claims 
related to cell-site simulators in a fashion similar to that employed by the 
Southern District of New York, allowing law enforcement to rely on cell-
site simulators only when prior judicial authorization is sought.
136
 The 
government’s unfettered power to assemble data so intimately connected 
with a person’s everyday life through real-time location tracking via their 
cellphone would otherwise certainly have a chilling effect on personal and 
associational freedoms; indeed, this effect may be so severe as to “alter the 





John Perry Barlow—a former Wyoming rancher, Grateful Dead lyricist 
and co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation
138
—once cheekily 
observed: “Relying on the government to protect your privacy is like asking 
                                                                                                             
 135. James B. Astrachan & Christopher J. Lyon, Cell-Site Simulators and the Fourth 
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court order, or consumer consent); WASH. REV. CODE. § 9.73.260 (2015) (requiring a prior 
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that law enforcement must obtain a warrant to track or identify the location of a 
communication device). 
 137. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
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a Peeping Tom to install your window blinds.”
139
 Courts should be wary of 
the government’s intention to use citizens’ cellphones as tracking devices 
without first seeking judicial authorization as cell-site simulators make their 
way into law enforcement agencies across the country.
140
 Even though the 
purchase and use of cell-site simulators is shrouded in secrecy by many 
agencies, the American Civil Liberties Union has identified seventy-two 
federal agencies ranging from the United States Navy to the Internal 
Revenue Service known to have the technology.
141
 Even then, this figure 
does not include the dozens of state and city agencies (such as the 
Oklahoma City Police Department) that also have cell-site simulators in 
their electronic surveillance arsenal.
142
 Cell-site simulators, quite literally, 
are coming to a city near you. As such, courts across the country should 
heed the command of the Southern District of New York in United States v. 
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